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MORAL HAZARD IN THE OIL PATCH: THE EFFECT OF THE BANK- 
ING CRISIS ON RTC HOTEL APPRAISALS IN THE AMERICAN 
SOUTHWEST 
Michael C. Dalbor 
ABSTRACT 
This paper compares appraised hotel values of Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC) properties in the American Southwest ("Oil Patch" states) with their respec- 
tive market values. The RTC was given the task of having hotel properties 
appraised and subsequently auctioned for sale. However, RTC officials were aware 
they had limited time and funding for their operations. Consequently, RTC officials 
faced a significant amount of political pressure to sell non-performing assets 
quickly, particularly in the Oil Patch where banking problems were especially 
severe. Given these circumstances, the RTC may have been motivated to influence 
appraised hotel values downward to sell more assets faster. The results of this paper 
indicate appraised hotel values to be lower than their market values in the region. 
Moreover, the differences between appraised values and market values were signif- 
icantly more negative in the Oil Patch than in other regions. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to compare appraised hotel values completed for the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) with hotel market values in the American Southwest 
during the period of RTC operations (1989-1995). Given the overwhelming task for the 
RTC of resolving the nation's savings and loan crisis and the limited amount of funding 
given for this task, the RTC needed to sell assets rapidly. This may have led the RTC to 
encourage appraisers to push hotel values downward in an effort to accept lower bids 
and remove non-performing assets from the books. This paper provides evidence that 
appraised hotel values were significantly lower than market values in the southwestern 
states, and that these differences were significantly greater than those in other regions of 
the United States. The results support the notion that relationships in the process and the 
motivations of the parties affect appraised values. 
Background 
The banking crisis of the 1980s was particularly severe in the southwestern United 
States. More than half of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's resolution costs 
from 1986 to 1994 were generated by bank failures in the "Oil Patch" states of Arkansas, 
Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Furthermore, over 70 percent of United 
States bank failures between 1987 and 1989 occurred in the Southwest. The state with the 
most problems was Texas, which accounted for nearly 30 percent of RTC resolution costs 
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The initial problem of the 1980s for savings and loan institutions became the steep 
increase in interest rates in 1980 and 1981. Rates on deposits subsequently began to 
exceed the rates on existing home mortgage loans held by these institutions. In an 
attempt to help the thrift industry the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone- 
tary Control Act of 1980 phased out interest rate controls and allowed thrifts to earn 
higher returns by lending for commercial real estate projects. 
However, this action was taken too late to effectively help the thrifts. In response, the 
Garn-St. Germain Act was passed in 1982 to help the industry become solvent. As dis- 
cussed by Dotsey and Kuprianov (1990), the major feature of the act was to forestall gov- 
ernment intervention via institution closure, which led to further accumulated losses for 
deposit insurance funds. 
A policy of non-government intervention, called regulatory forbearance, was strictly 
adhered to in the American Southwest. Research by Cole (1993) found that thrift institu- 
tions in that region were significantly more likely to be insolvent, but had a much lower 
probability of closure than did thrifts in other regions. Cole attributes this fact to political 
pressure to keep thrifts open in the Southwest and to the insufficient regulatory staff in 
the region that was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the problem. 
The lack of non-risk-based deposit insurance before 1992 also provided an incentive 
for moral hazard by bank officers. As shown by Gilbert (1990), deposit insurance created 
an investment atmosphere that allowed banks to assume greater risks than they normally 
would have without the insurance. Thus, bankers had the incentive to "grow out of their 
problems" by engaging in risky lending activities such as increased commercial real 
estate lending. 
Additionally, thrift officials took excessive risks because of the lack of equity capital. 
As shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the less management equity in the firm, the 
greater the incentive for managers to consume perquisites. Banks have historically main- 
tained some of the lowest amounts of equity capitalization. Furthermore, Park (1994) 
shows that the lack of equity capital encouraged banks to engage in risky behavior 
because owners can reap any positive benefits while losses will be borne primarily by 
debt holders. 
The moral hazard problems at lending institutions spilled over into the appraisal 
industry. As problems in the banking industry began to increase, the appraisal process 
and the industry itself fell under increased scrutiny. The U.S. House Committee on Gov- 
ernment Operations (1986) held hearings in 1985 on appraisal practices and concluded 
that the lack of appraiser certification and the practice of "client advocacy appraising" 
contributed to the savings and loan crisis. Moreover, according to federal regulators in 
the southwestern U.S., "many appraisals were apparently out of touch with reality and 
... inflated appraisals were easy to ~ b t a i n . " ~  Thus, for perhaps the first time, relation- 
ships in the appraisal process were considered to have a significant impact on appraisal 
results. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, 1997, p. 
304. 
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Sample / alternative hypothesis T Statistic P Value 
Oil Patch / mean difference less than 0 - 1.42 .08 
Non-Oil Patch / mean difference equal to 0 1.61 .11 
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch mean differences equal 2.11 .04 
Panel A - Wilcoxon test of medians 
W 
Sample / alternative hypothesis Statistic P Value 
Oil Patch / median difference less than 0 260.5 .05 
Non-Oil Patch / median difference equal to 0 1951.0 .35 
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch median differences unequal 5456.0 .03 
Panel B - Kruskal-Wallis test of medians 
H 
Sample/ alternative hypothesis Statistic P Value 
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch median differences equal 5.82 .02 
Panel C- Mood's median test 
Chi-Square 
Sample / alternative hypothesis Statistic P Value 
Oil Patch / non-Oil Patch median differences equal 5.24 .02 
Table 3 
Non-parametric test results 
The median difference is calculated as the appraised value minus the sales price, divided by the sales 
price. For hotel appraisals in the Oil Patch, the expectation is for the median difference to be less than 
zero. Furthermore, hotel appraisals in the Oil Patch are expected to have greater negative differences 
than appraisals in other regions. 
Panel A of Table 3 repeats the three tests used in Table 2 by using the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Sum test. The results of this test largely confirm those found using the t dis- 
tribution. The most important test is to examine the differences between the two subsam- 
ples. Accordingly, the Kruskal-Wallis method and Mood's Median Test were also used to 
further assess the reliability of the Wilcoxon results. Both tests support the results pre- 
viously obtained. Furthermore, the Mood's Median Test is highly robust against outliers 
and both Kruskal-Wallis and Mood's Median tests are considered non-parametric alter- 
natives to an ANOVA model. 
Nevertheless, the ANOVA model for this analysis is %DIFF = y.. + a1 OILPATCH+ Ei. 
The single explanatory variable used is OILPATCH, an indicator variable for those 
appraisals completed for hotels located in Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
and Texas. ERROR is the error term in the model. The results of the analysis are shown in 


